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Abstract 
Exchange rate assessment is becoming increasingly relevant for economic surveillance in the EU. The 
persistence of different wage and productivity dynamics among EMU countries or EU members with a fixed 
exchange regime with euro, coupled with the impossibility of correcting competitiveness differentials via the 
adjustment of nominal rates, have resulted into divergent dynamics in Real Effective Exchange Rates. This 
paper explores the role of economic fundamentals in explaining medium/long-run movements in the Real 
Effective Exchange Rates in the European Union over the period 1994-2012 by using heterogeneous, 
cointegrated panel frameworks in static and dynamic terms. In addition, the paper provides an analysis of the 
misalignments of the rate for each member state based on the “equilibrium” measure calculated from the 
permanent component of the fundamentals (BEER). 
The misalignments in EU28 are huge and the patterns differ significantly among groups. Therefore, despite 
the influence of the fundamentals is quite similar, the differences in the transfer variable (which affect the 
BEER) and in the actual Real Effective Exchange Rate are key. The core countries have been undervalued 
for almost the whole period, which entails from an important increase in competitiveness for those countries. 
Instead the periphery has experienced high rates, especially in Portugal. In addition, the behavior of CEECs 
is driven, as expected, by the transition process and influenced by the criteria to the accession to the EU. The 
misalignments in this case are still extremely wide and reflect these phenomena. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Exchange rate assessment is becoming increasingly relevant for economic surveillance in the EU. The 
persistence of different wage and productivity dynamics among EMU countries or EU members with a fixed 
exchange regime to the euro, coupled with the impossibility of correcting competitiveness differentials via 
the adjustment of nominal rates, have resulted into divergent dynamics in Real Effective Exchange Rates, 
REER (Salto and Turrini, 2010). For new member countries abundant capital inflows after transition and 
during catching up were often coupled with conspicuous current account deficits and price competitiveness 
losses. The same holds for a number of countries in the periphery of the euro area. 
As explained by Galstyan and Lane (2009), the long-run behavior of the REER is relevant  in the context of 
EMU to interpret the competitiveness differentials across members having the same currency and for new 
member countries which have planned or have just joined the euro zone in order to determine the appropriate 
entry rate1. The long-run REER analysis for non-euro area countries with a floating nominal exchange 
regime, like Sweden and UK, gives an interesting comparison with the EMU. 
An assessment of the REER is key not only in an EMU perspective but also for the whole EU. This is 
because different fundamentals and misalignments in this rate can influence the effectiveness of the common 
policies and the integration process. The REER itself reflects not only the structure of production, 
development and trade behavior of a member, but also its exchange rate policy in case of countries with 
flexible regimes. The comparison among countries with different characteristics is therefore extremely 
interesting. The assessment of EU28 as a whole provides a rough measure of the EU integration process and 
the performance of a union with common institutions, policies and funding programs. 
This paper explores the role of economic fundamentals in explaining long-run movements in the Real 
Effective Exchange Rates (REER) in the European Union over the period 1994-2012 by using primarily a 
heterogeneous, cointegrated panel framework. In addition, the paper provides an analysis of the 
misalignments of REER for each member state based on the “equilibrium” REER measure calculated from 
the permanent component of the fundamentals and called Behavioral Effective Exchange Rate (BEER). The 
time span covers the transition periods for the Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs), the first stages 
of the EMU, the introduction of the euro and the crisis. In this analysis the European Union includes 28 
countries. Croatia is therefore included in the sample2. Croatia is used as an “acceding” country to draw a 
comparison with other CEECs which are EU members already.  
                                                          
1In contrast to Denmark and the UK, the new Member States do not have an opt-out clause from obligation to adopt the euro at some 
point in the future. Sooner or later, it will therefore be necessary to assess what exchange rate might be best suited for entry to ERM -
II and for the irrevocable conversion rate (Égert and Lommatzsch, 2005). 
2The analysis is also conducted analyzing 3 different groups of countries separately: core (close to Germany and highly rated), 
periphery (mostly Southern-European countries) and CEECs.  
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This paper contributes to the literature along three dimensions. Firstly it considers specifically the EU as an 
overall group of advanced and transition countries using data updated to 2012, which includes the financial 
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in the EU. The analysis is not restricted to the current euro area (Coudert 
et al., 2013) but sheds light on the REER determinants of possible new entrants (mainly EU-member 
CEECs) and compares EMU countries with other advanced countries of the EU with floating exchange rate 
regimes, such as Sweden or UK.  
Secondly, following the approach by Chudik and Mongardini (2007), it applies different econometric 
techniques to estimate the panel’s long-run elasticities in the EU context, which include heterogeneous panel 
methods, as the Group Mean Fully Modified OLS (GM-FMOLS) and Mean Group estimator for the dynamic 
setup.  
We provide an analysis of the Equilibrium REER looking at the misalignment with respect to the actual 
REER. Equilibrium REER is analyzed looking at different points in time: i) 1997, before the exchange rates 
were fixed for the first EMU members; ii) 2002 with the actual introduction of the euro; iii) 2004 with the 
enlargement to the CEECs; iv)  from 2006 onwards. 
Considering EMU members alone, indeed the evolution of the external value of the euro has raised concerns 
that the exchange rate might have moved out of line with fundamentals. For instance, we would have 
expected in the peripheral member countries an overvalued exchange rate since the mid-2000s due to a 
worsening in productivity or in the external position (Coudert et al., 2013). This is the reason why we 
analyze a measure of the “equilibrium” exchange rate as a benchmark against which the actual development 
of the exchange rate can be judged (Maeso–Fernandez et al., 2002). We found that the misalignments in 
EU28 are huge and the patterns differ significantly among groups. In addition, despite the influence of the 
fundamentals is quite similar, the differences in the transfer variable and in the actual Real Effective 
Exchange Rate are key. The core countries have been undervalued for almost all the considered period, 
which entails from an important increase in competitiveness for those countries. Instead the periphery has 
experienced high rates, which goes extreme in the case of Portugal. At the end, the behavior of CEECs is 
driven, as expected, by the transition process and influenced by the criteria to the accession to the EU. The 
misalignments in this case are still extremely wide and persistent and reflect these phenomena. 
The paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature on the long-run fundamentals of 
REER and the “equilibrium” measures. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework. In Section 4, the 
empirical methodology is discussed. Section 5 describes the dataset and the econometric techniques. Section 
6 then interprets the estimation results followed by the presentation of the derived real misalignment. Section 
7 present some robustness checks and Section 8 provides the analysis of the misalignments. The conclusions 
and some policy implications are lastly in Section 9. 
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2. Literature review 
 
There are three main relevant literature’s strands related to our research question. The first strand concerns 
the long-run determinants of the REER, the second one provides measures of “equilibrium” REER and the 
third one studies the combination of determinants and possible misalignments of REER in different groups of 
countries.  
The literature on the determinants is very extensive. In modeling the long-run behavior of the REER, the 
focus has been on factors such as productivity, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the trade balance (TB) or the 
net foreign asset (NFA) position. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004) consider the link between the net foreign asset position, the trade 
balance and the REER and thereafter the determinants of the latter. The relationship between international 
payments and the REER is called “the transfer problem”. The wealth effects and international investment 
income flows associated with nonzero net foreign asset positions require some degree of real-exchange-rate 
adjustment. A debtor country which must run trade surpluses to service its external liabilities could require a 
more depreciated REER in the long-run. On the contrary, country with a positive NFA position can run 
persistent trade deficits. In turn, all else equal, the capability to sustain a negative net export balance in 
equilibrium is associated with an appreciated REER. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) use an intertemporal 
optimizing model to structure their panel setup, finding  that a) the magnitude of the transfer effect varies 
systematically with the way REER is measured and that it is larger for the CPI-deflated REER;  b) the size of 
the transfer effect is related to country characteristics such as trade openness, output per capita, country size, 
the composition of external liabilities, and restrictions on the external payments system; and c) the effect is 
stronger for developing countries compared to the industrial ones. 
The most comprehensive study on the topic is given by Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti, and Lee (2013), where the 
authors study the long-run determinants of the REER including in the data set: 48 industrial countries and 
emerging markets for the period 1980–2004, at annual frequency. The fundamental determinants of REER 
are: the relative labor productivity of the traded sector relative to the non-traded, as a proxy for the Balassa–
Samuelson effect3; the (commodities) terms of trade; the NFA over trade; the nominal government 
consumption to GDP and an index of trade restrictions and administered prices in consumer prices. The 
authors find that the REER co-moves positively with the terms of trade for all the groups. The NFA position, 
the relative productivity and the government consumption are key for the REER in emerging countries only. 
Finally they show the importance of accounting for trade liberalization and (the relative importance of 
administered prices in the consumer prices for the “transition” period of Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs).  
                                                          
3This is a more refined measure of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. If appropriate data are not available for a country, productivity is 
often proxied by GDP per capita that not only captures productivity (Galstyan and Lane, 2009) but is also a proxy for demand-side 
effect and is connected to education and demographic factors (Égert and Lahrèche-Révil, 2003). 
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Concerning the low income countries, Christiansen et al. (2010) provide an analysis of REER determinants 
in the long-run adding demographic variables such as population growth and old-age dependency ratio and 
international aids, which are strongly significant for these countries. Galstyan and Lane (2009) instead 
highlighted the role of government spending decomposed as consumption and investments4.  
 
The second strand of literature takes into account the “equilibrium” REER and the methods to calculate it. 
As explained in Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002) there are many ways to calculate an “equilibrium” REER, the 
main ones are: i) the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), ii) the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER), 
iii) the Underlying Internal-External Balance approach (UIEB)  or iv) its variant as the Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) by Isard and Faruqee (1998) and Lee et al. (2008).  
The PPP as a measure of “equilibrium” REER has been criticized by most of the literature, since it ignores 
the long-run determinants of the REER (MacDonald, 2000). The FEER is the rate that closes the gap 
between the Current Account norm (based on the estimation of Current Account determinants) and the 
underlying Current Account normally based on IMF projections. This method together with BEER and UIEB 
has been widely used by the IMF in the Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues (CGER). However, the 
FEER has been proved being very sensitive to small changes in the assumptions of the model (Schnatz, 
2011). An alternative measure  is represented by the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) as in 
Clark and MacDonald (1999), Alberola et al. (1999, 2002), Alberola (2003) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009, 
2010) among others, in which the importance of the determinants are recognized and they used to calculate 
the “equilibrium”. We decided to use this measure of the “equilibrium” REER because it is more reliable in 
case of small samples (Schnatz, 2011). 
The last strand of literature concerns studies on the combination of determinants and possible misalignments 
of REER in different groups of countries of our interest. For the euro zone, the main reference is the paper by 
Coudert et al. (2013), which focuses on the period 1980-2010 for 11 euro zone members, namely: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The 
“equilibrium” REER depends on a productivity variable and the NFA position (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2009, 
2010). The authors conclude that there has been an increase in misalignments since the currency union and 
this is stronger and more persistent in peripheral countries. Moreover, the speed of adjustment toward the 
“equilibrium” REER is much slower than for core members5. 
Concerning the transition country, the paper by Maeso–Fernandez et al. (2002) is relative to 25 OECD 
countries (and among them 10 new EU states) between 1975 and 2002. The fundamentals taken into account 
are productivity variables, a proxy of the NFA position as the cumulative current account, and a selection of 
additional variables reflecting the international economic environment (the terms of trade),  measures related 
                                                          
4In this paper the trade balance over GDP is used instead of NFA position. 
5In this paper the NFA position is however not taken lagged and the regressor does not take into account the heterogeneity among 
euro zone members. 
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to the fiscal stance and monetary policy considerations (the government spending) and economic openness. 
The results of this paper show that in the long term the  REER of transition countries depends on 
developments in relative per-capita income (as a productivity measure), relative government spending and 
openness. Misalignments in the transition economies are studied in Halpern &Wyplosz (1997), where the 
authors find that a continuing appreciation of the rate follows an initial depreciation at the beginning of 
transition. This occurs to restore equilibrium and is also due to a change in demand and production in these 
countries. A policy study of the REER in EU candidates has been published in the ECB working paper by 
Orszaghova et al. (2013), even though if without any analysis of determinants or misalignments. In this 
article the authors analyze developments in the external competitiveness of these countries between 1999 and 
2011, stressing the relevant loss in competitiveness in the pre-crisis period. 
At the end Carrera and Restout (2008) study for Latin America the REERs and its misalignments by using 
heterogeneous (static) panel cointegration techniques. The period considered is 1970-2006. The authors also 
divide the sample in two regions “South America and Caribbean” and “Central America”, which behave 
differently.  The determinants of REER include also the de facto exchange rate regime and government 
spending. They conclude that the Latin American countries experienced a persistent overvaluation in their 
REERs. 
 
3. Theoretical frame work 
 
To illustrate how a set of fundamentals influence the REER, we consider a standard neoclassical small open 
economy model as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) when both supply and demand factors affect the 
REER6. Therefore we estimate the reduced-form long-run relation between the REER and its fundamentals. 
This approach has been followed  also by  Ricci et al. (2013) but it is good to recall that Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti’s (2004) model does not include other determinants, as for instance the government spending as in 
Galstyan and Lane (2009). 
In this small open economy model the steady-state analysis gives the reduced-form long-run relation 
between the REER and its fundamentals. The variation in the real effective exchange rate, which is in log 
levels, is as the following: 
log = 1 − log	 =  +    +  log + log	
                                                  (1) 
                                                          
6In the paper the REER is called RER. We decided to use the name “REER” instead because it is more precise. In the small open 
economy model in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), the real exchange rate is a monotonic transformation of the relative price of non-
tradables.  
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where1 −  is the weight placed on consumption of non-traded goods in the utility function,  is the price 
of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods,  is the NFA, is the tradable (T) output,  is total output 
and  stands for the terms of trade. In the model all the coefficients should be positive. Therefore, the real 
exchange rate is increasing in NFA, tradable output and terms of trade. From this specification we derive our 
empirical model: 
log = 	 +   +  log  +  log!"! + #                                                    (2) 
With as GDP or trade,   as a Balassa-Samuelson indicator (in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) is the 
GDP per capita relative to the trading partners7) and !"! is the terms of trade. 
An alternative measure of the transfer effect is the TB over GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002; Galstyan 
and Lane, 2009; Galstyan, 2010). A creditor country should experience a real appreciation (a decrease in 
competitiveness) because of the rise in the steady-state consumption. The expected sign for the NFA is 
positive. This brings a deficit in the trade balance in the traded sector. The sign of the TB coefficient is 
instead expected to be negative. The relation between the two variables: NFA and TB depends on the 
composition of the international balance sheet of the country of interest and depends also on returns on assets 
and liabilities (Galstyan and Lane, 2009). 
The equation which regulates the linkages between TB and the REER (here REER =$ = $where lambda 
is the share of non-traded goods in the optimal household expenditure) is reported by Galstyan and Lane 
(2009) and comes from an adapted version of the two-sector small open economy model by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996). Log-linearizing around this steady state and solving the system, we have the relative price of 
non-traded goods ($)8: 
$ =	−% +	1 − & 1 − & % + '() + *)+ − )+, + '-%                                                           (3) 
where% is the total factor productivity of the non-tradable sector, and % is for the tradable; & and & are 
respectively the factor of production of capital in non-tradable and tradable sector; -%  stands for public capital 
stock.  In this setup ' > 0 and ' instead can be >, = or< 0 and they are coefficients representing factor of 
productions and share of tradable and non-tradable goods in the optimal household expenditure. If our 
country of interest is a creditor in the long run (therefore	) > 0) the effect should be positive for the REER 
because  ' > 0	. In the traded sector we will have, in the long-run, a deficit in the Trade Balance having 
)! =	−() in equilibrium. The expression [ )+ − )+ ] represents the difference in government 
                                                          
7As reported in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), in the empirics the relative GDP per capita can be used as proxy for the relative 
levels of tradable output in case of lack of sectorial data.  In our analysis we provide also the tradable output avoiding using a proxy 
for that. 
8Hatted variables stand for deviation from the steady state. 
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expenditure between non-tradable sector and tradable sector. Normally the sign of the argument within the 
brackets is positive, because this would shift the aggregate consumption toward the non-tradables, causing an 
appreciation of the REER. 
At the end, the theoretical explanation for the calculation of the equilibrium is based on MacDonald (2000). 
The starting point to calculate is the UIP condition augmented for the risk premium 0. 
∆1234 =	1 − 1234 = ( − (∗ − 0                                                                                                              (4) 
Where ∆1234  is the expected variation from t to t+k of the real exchange rate taken as 1 ≡ 7 − 8 + 7∗ 
with 8 is the log of the spot exchange rate, 7 is the log of domestic price level and 7∗ is the log of foreign 
price level. ( − (∗is the differential between the domestic real interest rate and the foreign one. 
Therefore we take 1234 = 19 as the “equilibrium” real exchange rate or the “long-run” component of the 
rate. The vector of the determinants include: the terms of trade (:;:), a Balassa-Samuelson/relative 
productivity component (<8)9 and the NFA (or the cumulative Current Account as its proxy) or the trade 
balance (TB). Clark and MacDonald (1999) use  a Vector Error Correction Model framework in order to 
have the components of 19. The first vector stands for this relation10: 
19 = =	;(	!; :;:; <8 = ′@AB                                                                                             (5) 
whereβ′@  is the vector of estimated long-term coefficients and XEB are the HP filtered values of the 
fundamentals (Carrera and Restout, 2011)11. Clostermann and Friedman (1998) estimate only the first part by 
using a dynamic Error Correction Model. We apply the same idea for our panel together with the modified 
OLS estimators following the literature (for instance Courdet et al, 2013). In order to have the misalignment 
between the “equilibrium” REER and its actual value, we simply calculate the difference:  
1FG = 	1 −	1H:                                                                                                                                               (6) 
 
4. Empirical Methodology  
The log-linearized model resulted from the analysis is the following:  (II(, = 	 + BA + # where reer is 
the (log) of REER. We use the REER deflated by Consumer Price Index (CPI) and vis-à-vis 37 partners.  
X is the vector of the fundamentals. In the baseline equation we have the (log) of the terms of trade relative 
to the trade partners and the (log) of the real GDP per capita relative to the trade partners to capture the 
                                                          
9The variables in small letters are taken in logs. 
10The second vector explains the real interest rate differentials and the risk premium. 
11As reported by Schnatz (2011) and Clark and MacDonald (1999, 2004), HP filtering the fundamentals takes into account the 
possible misalignments of these variables themselves, giving only the permanent part of them. 
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Balassa-Samuelson effect. The last variable for the baseline specification is the trade balance (goods and 
services) over GDP as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), Galstyan and Lane (2009), Galstyan (2010). As 
alternatives we use the Net Foreign Asset position over GDP (or trade) as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) 
and Ricci et al. (2013)12 or the cumulative Current Account over GDP (or trade) in order to remove 
completely the valuation effect (Maeso-Fernandez et al, 2002). We better use the cumulative CA instead of 
the NFA position because the NFA can be decomposed as: 
: = ∑ L:−M +NO:∞M=1                                                                                                                                           (7) 
where CA is the Current Account and VAL the valuation effect (see Lane and Shambaugh, 2010). Even if 
there are no changes in the number of assets and/or liabilities for a country, the NFA position can change 
because of changing in the price or the exchange rate (i.e. the market value) of the same assets and/or 
liabilities. Therefore using NFA as a regressor for the real exchange rate, even if lagged by 1 period, can 
bring endogeneity problems to the estimated equation. This is the reason why we decided to use the trade 
balance or the cumulative CA rather than the NFA. 
The Balassa-Samuelson variable can be also proxied by the (log) of relative manufacturing productivity as in 
Galstyan (2010) or the (log) of relative services productivity together with the ratio of the productivity of 
services over manufacturing as in Ricci et al. (2010) or Bénassy‐Quéré et al. (2009). 
The government expenditure over GDP relative to the trading partners is added to the baseline following the 
recent publications by the External Balance Assessment (EBA) of the IMF or the literature (Galstyan and 
Lane, 2009). 
 
5. Data description and estimation strategy 
 
The data we use to estimate the model covers the period from 199413 to 2012 with annual frequency from 28 
EU countries, namely (year of entry in the EU): Austria (1995), Belgium (1952), Bulgaria (2007), Croatia 
(2013), Cyprus (2004), Czech Republic (2004), Denmark (1973), Estonia (2004), Finland (1995), France 
(1952), Germany (1952), Greece (1981), Hungary (2004), Ireland (1973), Italy (1952), Latvia (2004), 
Lithuania (2004), Luxembourg (1952), Malta (2004), Netherlands (1952), Poland (2004), Portugal (1986), 
Romania (2007), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain (1986), Sweden (1995) and United Kingdom 
(1973). The source of the data and their descriptions are provided in the Annex. The REER has been deflated 
                                                          
12The NFA is taken lagged by one period. As reported by Ricci et al. (2013), one might expect the presence of reverse causality 
between REER and NFA. Using a lagged NFA should reduce the bias. In addition NFAs are usually measured at the end of the year, 
while REERs are period averages. At the end, using 1-lag NFA should help abstracting the valuation effect from the NFA 
component. 
13We have chosen 1994 as a starting point for our data because this is the first year in which all the former Soviet countries now in 
the EU have been independent. 
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by CPI14 and is taken vis-à-vis 37 trading partners15. The data are from Eurostat and EU Commission DG 
Ecfin. The same trade weights are employed to construct relative output per capita, relative government 
expenditure and relative productivity measures. The relative variables are built as the variable for our 
country of interest x over the trade weighted average16 of the variable. 
After having tested the presence of Unit Roots (Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test)17 and cointegration 
(Westerlund (2007) error-correction-based panel cointegration tests), it results that our variables are non-
stationary and cointegrated. 
 
The methods used are for the static setup: (1) the within Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and within Fully-Modified 
OLS (FMOLS) estimator and (2) the between Fully-Modified OLS also known as Group Mean (GM)-
FMOLS proposed by Pedroni (2000) and used for instance by Carrera and Restout (2008) and Roudet et al. 
(2012), which will be also applied to build the BEER. In addition, we provide an analysis of the long-run 
determinants by using a dynamic framework: a panel Error Correction Model (see Annex 2). That has not 
been used to build up the equilibrium measure of REER but has been studied for comparison reasons.  
The panel is cointegrated and such large differences among countries led us to assume that preference should 
be given to heterogeneous coefficients. In this case, as proved by Pedroni (2000), the simply panel OLS 
estimator for the static setup cannot be used because it would be biased. Its standardized distribution would 
be also dependent on nuisance parameters associated with the serial correlation structure of the data. 
The recent literature apply in these cases: the Dynamic OLS (DOLS), which adds leads and lags of first 
differences of the regressors and the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) which is a semi-parametric correction to 
the OLS estimator which eliminates the second order bias induced by the endogeneity of the regressors 
(Philip and Hansen, 1990).  
However for our panel the Group-Mean (GM-) DOLS or FMOLS estimator (Pedroni, 2000) would be less 
biased. These estimators behave well even in relatively small samples under a variety of scenarios. Pesaran 
and Smith (1995) show that in this case group-mean estimators provide consistent estimates of the sample 
mean of the heterogeneous cointegrating vectors and the within estimators (i.e. the non-Group Mean ones) 
do not. Concerning the DOLS, in Pedroni (2000) Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the group-mean DOLS 
has relatively small size distortion relative to the within DOLS estimator, therefore we keep the regular 
DOLS estimator. The GM- FMOLS instead performs better than the within FMOLS.  
                                                          
14We did the same kind of analysis by using the REER deflated by GDP and ULC for the total economy and manufacturing only. 
The results are available upon request. 
1537 partner countries (EU28 plus other advanced countries, namely Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US). We do not 
include Australia, Canada, Mexico and New Zealand (-0.01/0.04 of the total). 
16The weights change over time and are the same weights used to build the REER. 
17For the GDP-REER pvalue = 0.0898; CPI-REER pvalue = 0.0042; ULC-REER pvalue = 0.0839. This test investigates null 
hypotheses ofthe general form Ho: rho_i = 1 versus Ha: rho_i< 1. The test has as the null hypothesis that all the panels are (trend) 
stationary, which is in our cases rejected. 
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Therefore, we prefer the GM- FMOLS estimator, which is built as the average of the within FMOLS 
estimator over the cross-sectional dimension: %QFRSG = TU ∗ ∑ %QFRSG,V . A conventional FMOLS 
estimator, as in Philips and Hansen (1990), can be obtained by transforming the regressand and then 
applying the OLS procedure, as explained in Wang and Wu (2012).  The authors developed a system which 
includes a cointegration equation (a), the regressor equation (b) and a regressor innovation term (c). 
W = XB + YB  + Z (a) 
X = [Y + [Y + # (b) 
Δ# = Z (c )                                                                                                                                                   (8) 
Where d are deterministic trends, XB  is a vector of integrated regressors, is a vector of slope parameters. 
And then they transform the regressand in the following way: 
W2 = W − ]^_@`Z^                                                                                                                      (9) 
whereZ^ is the differenced residuals of the regressor equation;  ]^ and _@`are taken from the estimated 
long-run covariance using the sample autocovariances. 
The GM-FMOLS estimator can be obtained also through the following cointegrated system as explained by 
Carrera and Restout (2008) and Pedroni (2000, 2001): 
W =	 + aB  + b                                                                                                                                    (10) 
a = a,` + #                                                                                                                                            (11) 
where  are the fixed effects, ais a k x 1 vector of integrated regressors,  is a k x 1 vector of slope 
parameters and the vector error process (b , #B )’ is stationary. Its asymptotic covariance matrix Ωd can be 
further decomposed: 
Ωd 	≡ 	 e
Ωfg ΩfhgΩhfg Ωhg i = 	Ω
 + Γ + ΓB                                                                                                             (12) 
where Ωfg and Ωhg are the long-run covariance of b and # ; Ωhfg gives the covariance between b and # 
and captures the endogenous feedback effect between the dependent variable W of which b is the error 
term and the regressors a, whose error term is represented by vector #. At the end, Ω is the covariance 
matrix in contemporaneous andΓ = e
Γfg ΓfhgΓhfg Γhg i is a weighted sum of auto-covariances. Given that, the GM-
12 
 
FMOLS is an estimator that eliminates this endogeneity bias between dependent variable and regressors in 
this way: 
%QFRSG = TU∑ *∑ a − a̅a − a̅BV ,`∑ a − a̅W∗V 	− !l	V                                 (13) 
whereW∗ = W − W9 −	Ω
@εui Ω@εip Δa and l = Γ
$qrs +	Ω@#bM0 −
Ω@εui Ω@εip TΓ
$qs + Ω@#M0 U and a̅and W9are the 
cross sectional simple average. 
 
At the end, we measure the “equilibrium” exchange rate as a benchmark against which the actual exchange 
rate can be judged. We apply the methodology used by Roudet et al. (2007) based on the elasticities 
estimated with GM-FMOLS for each country multiplied by the HP-detrended values of the fundamentals. 
This method is called Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) (Clark and MacDonald, 1999 and 
MacDonald, 2007, 2010). It is particularly appropriate for assessing whether movements of the REER 
represent misalignments or whether the “equilibrium” REER itself has shifted as a result of changes in 
economic fundamentals (Roudet et al., 2007). This method considers the “equilibrium” value not immutable 
but it can vary through time. Moreover, it assumes that the actual REER is mean reverting and 
misalignments are due to inadequate (temporary) macroeconomic policies (Carrera and Restout, 2008). 
 
 
6. The results: determinants and misalignments 
 
6.1 Expected results of the long-run determinants of REER 
One of the main determinants is the international payments variable. This classic issue in international 
economics is called “the transfer problem”. The wealth effects and the international investment income 
flows, associated with nonzero Net Foreign Asset (NFA) positions, require some degree of REER-
adjustment in the long run (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). Debtor countries tend to have more depreciated 
REER in the long run (which should improve their trade balance and current account position). Several 
studies found a “transfer effect”, i.e. in the long-run NFA improvements are associated with REER 
appreciation (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) among others) but using advanced countries’ data and 
extending the time period to 2012 the coefficient is expected to be small or even negative due to the 
valuation effect (Ricci et al., 2013)18. Instead the coefficient for the trade balance is expected to be negative: 
in the long run larger surpluses (deficits) in trade balance are associated with REER depreciation 
(appreciation). Countries with positive NFA position (or cumulative CA) indeed are more able to run trade 
                                                          
18We also use the cumulative CA as an alternative measure which is indeed NFA minus the valuation effect. 
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balance deficits (this does not mean that they WILL do it) and this should give an increase in the REER in 
the long run (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002). 
An improvement in the terms of trade (TOT) can increase the amount of imports for any given level of 
exports. This event can bring two different effects: an income effect and a substitution one (Carrera and 
Restout, 2008). The increase in the TOT makes the imports relatively cheaper (positive substitution effect) 
but brings also a rise in the purchasing power and in the demand for non-traded goods. This can cause an 
appreciation of the REER in order to restore the equilibrium. The terms of trade in industrial countries is 
expected to be positive following the outcome from the literature (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004 and De 
Gregorio and Wolf, 1994), therefore the income effect should be predominant in this case. The relative GDP 
per capita, as a measure of the Balassa-Samuelson effect19, is expected to be positive as well (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). According to this effect, the relative prices are determined by the differentials in 
productivity between traded and non-traded sectors. It is also common in transition countries for example, 
where the fast growth due to the end of trade barriers brings a huge rise in traded sector productivity respect 
to the non-traded one but the wages (and prices) increase in the whole economy. The non-traded productivity 
increases less than the relative wages. This increase in the relative prices of non-traded goods leads to an 
appreciation of the REER. 
6.2 The results of the long-run determinants of REER 
Applying the within estimators: DOLS and FMOLS for a baseline model20 (Table 1), the results are mostly 
in line with the previous studies (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002, 2004; Courdet et al., 2012). The exception 
concerns some coefficients of the transfer variables. These are not significant and for the full sample show 
the opposite sign with respect to the literature in case of NFA or cumulative CA. The sign of the trade 
balance instead is correct and sometimes significant. This result is confirmed by using GM-FMOLS (Table 2 
and Table 3). 
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
We argue that the proper estimator in this case has to deal with the heterogeneity of our panel and the 
presence of a small sample21. We decide to apply the Group Mean Fully Modified OLS (GM- FMOLS)22. 
                                                          
19As robustness check, we provide also other measures for the Balassa-Samuelson effect, reported in Table 4, like the productivity 
ratio between the two sectors and the relative productivity of manufacturing (as proxy for the traded sector) together with the relative 
GDP per capita as in Galstyan (2010). 
20The relative GDP per capita is taken here as capita in constant 2005 USD relative to weighted average of partners, as reported in 
the Annex. We run the regressions also using GDP per capita in constant PPP (see Courdet et al, 2012) but the results are not 
reported because are very similar.  
21
 The GM-FMOLS suffers also from smaller sample size distortions than the within estimators (simple DOLS or FMOLS) as 
reported by Pedroni (2001). 
22The alternative is the GM-DOLS for panel setups. To our knowledge there is still no comparison available between GM-DOLS and 
GM-FMOLS. By the way, in Carrera and Restout (2008), the authors claim that GM-DOLS suffers from two main drawbacks: it is 
too sensitive to the number of leads and lags, for which there is no statistical method to choose them properly, and even with only 1-
lead and 1-lag having a limited time span (in our case T=19) the degrees of freedom are  too short. 
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We also divide the sample in different groups:  core countries, periphery, CEECs and at the end we reported 
the euro zone without the new CEEC members (14 member states) and the complete euro zone as in 2012. 
The GM- FMOLS results are reported in Table 2 for the model with the trade balance. In Table 3a we 
reported the baseline framework with some alternative transfer variables: the 1-lag NFA over GDP (or trade) 
and the cumulative CA over GDP (or trade). In Table 3b we have the estimation for the set up with the 
cumulative CA over GDP divided in subsamples. In Table 4 and 5 there are some robustness checks. An 
extension with the relative government expenditure is reported in Table 6.  
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
In Table 2 are reported the results for the baseline setup with the trade balance over GDP as regressor23. The 
coefficient for the trade balance is negative as expected, even if it is only significant for core countries and 
CEECs. In the latter case it is quite small compared to the other subsamples24. The terms of trade and the 
relative GDP per capita are always positive and significant, in line with the literature. An exception is 
represented by core countries, whose coefficient for the GDP per capita is not significant although positive. 
There is no asymmetry between core and periphery in the euro zone. The CEECs behave differently, as 
expected, because of their level of development and the transition process. In Table 3a we run the regression 
for the full sample by using alternative variables for the transfer effect. The sign is expected to be positive, 
but we find the opposite. The Balassa-Samuelson variable is always positive and this result is robust in every 
specification, even if is smaller in magnitude with respect to the setup with the trade balance. The 
coefficients for terms of trade are negative and significant, if we use the cumulative CA, but turns to be 
positive again with the NFA. The sign of the cumulative CA and its significance in the subsamples is very 
much alike. In the case of CEECs alone, the absolute value is much higher. The other regressors are similar 
to the other specifications but smaller in magnitude.  
[TABLE 3a AROUND HERE] 
In Table 3b we provide the analysis for the subsamples, taking the cumulative CA over GDP as a regressor. 
Only in the case of core country, the cumulative CA has the expected sign. These are countries gained 
positive NFA positions (positive cumulative CA in our case) and this should bring an increase in their 
REERs in the medium/long-run, as expected. In other subsamples the coefficients for the cumulative CA is 
instead always negative and significant. Therefore for the periphery and CEECs we will have an additional 
increase in the REER even if these countries experienced a very negative cumulative CA.  
[TABLE 3b AROUND HERE] 
                                                          
23The between-dimension estimates (like GM-FMOLS) of the long-run deviation are larger than the corresponding within-dimension 
estimates (standard DOLS and FMOLS) as found also by Pedroni (2001) in the case of PPP analysis. 
24We run the same regression dividing the sample in more subsamples and the significance in the core is due to the presence of core 
countries not in the euro zone. Taken into account the CEECs not in the euro zone the coefficient turns even to slightly positive and 
significant. Results are available upon request. 
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7. Robustness checks and extensions 
 
The results for the full sample are confirmed in the robustness check, where we apply different Balassa-
Samuelson measures and we add a deterministic time trend (Table 4). The results are in line with the 
literature for the industrial countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). The trade balance coefficient is 
significant only when we use other regressors in the setup (productivity measures instead of relative GDP per 
capita).  
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]  
 In Table 5 we report the same analysis for the baseline model with trade balance and cumulative CA 
dividing the sample in an alternative way. The sub-samples are created with respect to the de facto exchange 
rate regimes and are namely: “fixed” for the EU members with fixed or intermediate/fixed regimes (like 
ERM II for instance) and “float” in case of intermediate floating/pure floating regimes. In this setup the trade 
balance is significant only when the samples are split (column 2 and 3), while in the whole sample or for the 
euro zone is not. The relative importance of this variable on the REER seems to be more influenced by the 
membership to the euro zone than by the fixed regimes vis-à-vis the euro per se. The cumulative CA 
coefficient is instead very similar across all the specifications instead. Comparing column 5 and 6, the terms 
of trade, for the float regimes, matter more than in fixed regime countries. The coefficient of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is even negative in case of floating regimes members and this is the only specification in 
which we find a negative coefficient. The floating regime group is composed by countries with very different 
stage of development25 and this might have influenced its sign. 
We also run the same regressions for the period before the crisis (1994-2007). The role of the trade balance 
in determining the REER in the medium/long run seems to be less important from the crisis onwards, while 
the cumulative CA remains essential26. 
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
At the end, we have a surprising result when we add the government expenditure relative to the trading 
partners (Table 6). The coefficient for this variable is strongly negative and significant, except for the 
periphery, where the sign is appropriate but is not significant. The coefficient should be positive because an 
increase in government expenditure should fall mainly on non-traded goods and this is supposed to bring an 
appreciation of the REER, as reported also by Ricci et al. (2013).  
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
                                                          
25These countries are: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK. 
26The results are available upon request. 
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8. BEER and exchange rate misalignments 
 
 
To calculate the BEER and therefore the misalignments between the actual CPI-REER and the equilibrium 
value we divided the sample in 3 parts: core, periphery and CEECs and we use the coefficients from these 
estimates (Table 2 and Table 3b). We calculate the BEER for both the trade balance and the cumulative CA, 
as determinants. The results are shown in Figures 1 for the core countries, Figure 2 for the periphery and in 
Figure 3 for the CEECs. At the end, we provide a comparative analysis of these two setups for couples of 
countries of interest: Italy/Germany (Figure 4), Ireland/UK (Figure 5), Finland/Sweden (Figure 6) and 
Croatia/Slovenia (Figure 7). 
Concerning the core members (Figure 1a) it is clear that, with the exception of Belgium, Finland, Sweden 
and partially of Luxembourg, their REER has been undervalued in the considered period. The misalignments 
in core countries are more evident looking at the calculation with cumulative CA. This variable not only 
incorporates imbalances in trade balance for each period but also shines light on the whole CA behavior 
through time. In all these countries the REER has been undervalued since the 90s and only in 2010 we can 
see a weak tendency to reverse the sign in Belgium. Germany is the only member state that from the early 
2000s to 2009 which experienced almost no misalignments in its REER. This means that the actual German 
rate is in line with its fundamentals. The other core countries instead experienced a more undervalued REER 
respect to what their fundamentals would suggest. This corresponding overvaluation of the other EU states, 
gives to the core an important advantage in terms of competitiveness. 
[FIGURE 1a AND 1b AROUND HERE] 
The figures concerning the periphery are similar using the TB or cumulative CA (Figures 2a and 2b). Ireland 
experienced a light undervaluation of the REER in the early 2000s, while after that the REER has been 
almost in line with its fundamental value. The fundamental rate itself was declining in this period, thanks to a 
huge increase in productivity and in GDP due to structural reform and pro-enterprise taxation, education and 
industrial relations together with a rapid increase in FDIs. Malta and Portugal reflect a huge decline in 
competitiveness, much more than Spain, Greece or Italy. Portugal especially faced competitiveness problems 
since the 90s, with low growth rates, increasing unemployment and very low productivity especially in high 
value-added sectors, which affected negatively the competitiveness. Portugal sustained significant losses in 
manufactures (notably textiles and apparel) only partly mitigated by gains in services (Moreno-Badia et al., 
2008). The Greek REER is still overvalued and the misalignment is even grown in the late 2000s (if the 
cumulative CA is taken as one of the determinants). The misalignments decreased in other periphery 
countries, but not enough as expected from the “transfer effect” literature, which suggest a mean reversion in 
the REER in the medium/long- run. 
[FIGURE 2a AND 2b AROUND HERE] 
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At the end, the CEECs misalignments, based on cumulative CA, after the early 2000s started to be relevant, 
as in Halpern & Wyplosz (1997). Among the CEECs, the lowest misalignments in the recent years are in 
Croatia, Romania and Slovenia. Poland experienced small misalignments only considering TB as a regressor 
to calculate the BEER. Halpern &Wyplosz (1997) find also that a continuing appreciation of the rate follows 
a initial depreciation at the beginning of transition. The initial undervaluation of the REER is evident looking 
at Figure 3b, where the cumulative CA is used as regressor. All the CEECs, except Slovenia and Latvia, 
experienced an undervaluation at the end of the 90s. This occurs when markets are liberalized, because of an 
increasing in demand for foreign assets given a negligible supply. It may be also due to the huge burst of 
inflation and to the lack of credibility of monetary authorities. The consequent appreciation is due to a 
change in demand, in production and related to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and the raising of production 
costs for natural resources. This adjustment however has been much higher than the equilibrium rate based 
on long-run determinants, which instead increased less than the actual rate. 
[FIGURE 3a AND 3b AROUND HERE] 
It is good to recall that the misalignments are due to a diverging path between the 2 measures of REER: the 
actual value and the equilibrium. This is caused by an increase/decrease in the actual value and/or a 
decrease/increase in the equilibrium (Figure 8 and 9).  Looking at the pattern of these two rates between 
2002 and 2010, if we use trade balance as a regressor, the biggest variations in REERs are experimented in 
UK, the CEECs and the periphery, while in the other core countries the rates changed less. The differences in 
BEERs are smaller for all the countries. 
[FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE] 
If we use the cumulative CA in the regression instead of the trade balance, the variation in the REER is again 
quite substantial in UK, the CEECs and the periphery countries like Ireland, Spain or Greece, while is less 
evident in other core countries. The BEERs vary much more in the CEECs, compared to the other groups, 
because the catching- up process which makes the Balassa-Samuelson measures greatly change. 
[FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE] 
We draw a comparison now between countries which are somehow similar for history and geographical 
proximity but have different exchange rate regimes (as Ireland and UK or Finland and Sweden), or they are 
main competitors (Germany and Italy) or they are former transition countries and only one is a EU and euro 
zone member state (Croatia and Slovenia).  Firstly we discuss Figure 4, in which we have the misalignments 
paths for Germany and Italy. Looking at the Italian situation compared to Germany, the differences are 
relevant. Until 2002, Italy had shown a moderate undervaluation of its REER. This is bigger than in 
Germany if we count for the cumulative CA. From 2004 on the German rate is slightly above zero, while the 
Italian REER diverges from the equilibrium. This is because, after being overvalued in the late eighties, the 
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Italian lira drastically depreciated after crises of EMS in 1993 and this left the country with an undervalued 
currency at the start of the European monetary union (Coudert et al, 2013). In addition, Italy has not pursued 
structural reforms and still suffers by the presence of other countries, especially in Eastern Europe and Asia, 
which exhibits a higher specialization similarity with China and other Asian countries (Di Mauro et al., 
2010). Corrective mechanisms did not slow down the overvaluation in peripheral countries, like Italy, during 
the crisis and the strength of the euro vis-à-vis the main currencies has deepened the misalignment. Germany 
focused on labor market reforms and more on investment on high-tech products which are less affected by 
specialization overlapping. This is reflected in BEER and REER behavior too. This gain in competitiveness 
generated also an increase of market shares (Di Mauro et al., 2010). 
[FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE] 
Looking at Figure 5 and 6, we can draw a comparison between a euro zone country and an EU member state 
with a floating exchange rate regime and therefore an independent monetary policy. UK and Sweden have an 
advantage in terms of competitiveness, having an undervalued REER for almost all the years also thanks to 
the behavior of their currencies. Ireland and Finland experienced a massive development until the early 
2000s. The first one reached high growth rates thanks to export-oriented technology and the pharmaceutical 
sectors. Finland experienced a huge increase in investments directed to communication and IT technologies. 
Both the countries benefited from a weaker euro in the international markets during the beginning of the 
monetary union but from 2007 onwards the strength of the common currency has been a disadvantage for 
them if compared with UK and Sweden. 
[FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE] 
[FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE] 
In Figure 7 we distinguish between the misalignments in Croatia and Slovenia. The misalignments for 
Croatia have followed the path explained in Halpern &Wyplosz (1997), while the Slovenian case is much 
different in the case of cumulative CA as regressor. Slovenia is in an advanced stage of development 
compared to the neighbor, but both countries in many respects implemented a common development model. 
The model was based on financial market deregulation accompanied with catching-up process and 
institutional anchoring to the EU (Radošević, 2014). The introduction of the euro in Slovenia only increased 
slightly the overvaluation of its REER, which is still moderate around 5-10%27. Croatia had shown an 
increase in the misalignment since 2003, when applied for EU membership. The country was in negotiations 
from 2005 until 2011. In 2007 the Croatian REER started to be higher than its equilibrium level. 
[FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE] 
                                                          
27This is however much stronger taken the Trade Balance as a determinant of the REER.  
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9. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
We find that there are no asymmetries in long-run determinants for core and periphery with the exception of 
the transfer variables.  The core countries, which experienced positive NFA positions, should have indeed an 
increase in their REERs in the medium-long run. Instead this effect is not found for this period in the 
periphery and CEECs, in which the coefficients for the cumulative CA is always negative and significant. 
Therefore in the periphery we should see in the long-run an additional increase in the REER even if these 
countries experienced a very negative cumulative CA (and NFA position).  
The misalignments in EU28 are huge and the patterns differ greatly among groups. Therefore, despite the 
influence of the fundamentals is quite similar, the differences in the transfer variable and in the actual Real 
Effective Exchange Rate are key. The core countries have been undervalued for almost the whole period, 
which entails from an important increase in competitiveness for those countries. Instead the periphery has 
experienced high rates, especially in Portugal. 
In addition, the behavior of CEECs is driven by the by the transition process and the criteria to the accession 
to the EU, as expected indeed. The misalignments reflect this phenomenon and are still extremely wide and 
persistent, due to changes in the fundamentals and in the actual REER. 
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Table 1: Within DOLS and FMOLS for the baseline model with different transfer variable and imfreg as regressors 
DOLS DOLS DOLS DOLS DOLS FMOLS FMOLS FMOLS FMOLS FMOLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER 
  
TB/GDP -0.292 -0.448** 
(0.295) (0.217) 
CUMCA/trade -0.0332 -0.00922 
(0.0288) (0.0279) 
CUMCA/gdp -0.0757 -0.0616 
(0.0517) (0.0494) 
NFA/trade (-1) -0.0216 -0.0175 
(0.0196) (0.0193) 
NFA/gdp(-1) -0.0441 -0.0459 
(0.0421) (0.0329) 
TOT 0.157 0.135* 0.118 0.121 0.117 0.132 0.107 0.137 0.0982 0.0920 
(0.111) (0.0770) (0.0768) (0.0758) (0.0784) (0.106) (0.0962) (0.0989) (0.0992) (0.101) 
YDUSD 0.0655 0.0692 0.0790 0.0524 0.0618 0.0647*** 0.0409** 0.0550*** 0.0386** 0.0478*** 
(0.0795) (0.0836) (0.0849) (0.0812) (0.0900) (0.0213) (0.0168) (0.0194) (0.0154) (0.0169) 
imfreg -0.00950 -0.0101 -0.0104 -0.00970 -0.0111 -0.0115 -0.0125 -0.0121 -0.0139 -0.0144 
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0111) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. DOLS and FMOLS here are not group mean estimators but are in the simple version. DOLS is estimated with 1 lag and 1 lead. FMOLS is with 1 
lag only. TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP (current USD) , CUMCA/trade is the cumulative CA over trade (imports + exports) in current USD,  CUMCA/gdp is the cumulative CA over 
gdp in current USD,  NFA/trade (-1) is the NFA position over trade in current USD lagged by one period, NFA/gdp(-1) is the NFA position over gdp in current USD lagged by one period, TOT is the log of the Terms of 
Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD, imfreg is the variable for the exchange rate regime. 
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Table 2: GM-FMOLS for the baseline model with trade balance over GDP as regressor 
  EU   core   periphery   CEECs   
euro 
(no CEECs)   euro 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER 
TB/gdp -2.0723   -3.8347***   -2.6858   -0.0794***   -3.0135   -2.8155 
  (0.314)   (0.434)   (0.722)   (0.522)   (0.401)   (0.379) 
TOT 0.6505***   1.1648***   0.7548***   0.1166    0.9288***    0.9883*** 
  (0.090)   (0.140)   (0.750)   (0.140)   (0.120)   (0.110) 
YDUSD 0.6225***   0.7370   0.4339***   0.6384***    0.5843**   0.6816*** 
  (0.080)   (0.180)   (0.130)   (0.090)   (0.120)   (0.110) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(current USD) , TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD. GM-FMOLS estimations 
are taken with 1 lag for the regressors and are calculated by the command @panelfm in RATS. In this Table are reported the results had without 
adding imfreg (the variable for the exchange rate regime), which is not one the fundamentals used to calculate the BEER. All the specifications 
include a constant term. 
 
 
Table 3a: GM-FMOLS for the baseline model with cumulative CA and NFA as regressor 
            
(1)          (2) (3) (4) 
CPIREER CPIREER CPIREER CPIREER 
CUMCA/trade -0.2764***         
  (0.028)         
CUMCA/gdp 
   -0.2904***       
    (0.04)       
NFA/trade(-1) 
  
  -0.1323***     
      (0.019)     
NFA/gdp(-1) 
  
    
 -0.2918***   
        (0.027)   
            
TOT -0.1782***  -0.2355*** 0.0439* 0.0037   
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
YDUSD 0.1718*** 0.1452*** 0.1959*** 0.1734***   
  (0.140) (0.130) (0.09) (0.09)   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CUMCA/trade is the cumulative CA over trade (imports + exports) in 
current USD, CUMCA/gdp is the cumulative CA over gdp in current USD,  NFA/trade (-1) is the NFA position over trade in current USD lagged by 
one period, NFA/gdp(-1) is the NFA position over gdp in current USD lagged by one period,, TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the 
log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD. GM-FMOLS estimations are taken with 1 lag for the variables and are calculated by the command 
@panelfm in RATS (Doan, 2012). In this Table are reported the results had without adding imfreg (the variable for the exchange rate regime), which 
is not one the fundamentals used to calculate the BEER. All the specifications include a constant term. 
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Table 3b: GM-FMOLS for the baseline model with cumulative CA over GDP as regressor 
  EU   core   periphery   CEECs   
euro 
(no CEECs)   euro 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER 
CUMCA/gdp 
 -0.2904***   0.1012***   -0.1238***   -0.7526***   -0.1536*** -0.2210*** 
  (0.04)   (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.088)   (0.029) (0.026) 
TOT -0.1782***   -0.1546***   -0.0134**   -0.4504***   0.0773** 0.0464*** 
  (0.04)   (0.08)   (0.15)   (0.08)   (0.05) (0.04) 
YDUSD 0.1718***   0.1955   0.2137***   0.0558***   0.3336*** 0.3796*** 
  (0.14)   (0.20)   (0.45)   (0.27)   (0.13) (0.12) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CUMCA/gdp is the cumulative CA over gdp in current USD, TOT is the 
log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD. GM-FMOLS estimations are taken with 1 lag for the 
variables and are calculated by the command @panelfm in RATS (Doan, 2012). In this Table are reported the results had without adding imfreg (the 
variable for the exchange rate regime), which is not one the fundamentals used to calculate the BEER. All the specifications include a constant term. 
 
 
Table 4: GM-FMOLS for an alternative model with relative productivities and time trend 
(robustness check) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  CPIREER CPIREER CPIREER  CPIREER 
  
  
TB/gdp -2.0723 -1.4746*** -1.6466***  -0.5049 
  (0.314) (0.23) (0.278)  (0.256) 
TOT 0.6505*** 0.6360*** 0.6708***  0.0410 
  (0.090) (0.07) (0.09)  (0.08) 
     
YDUSD 0.6225*** 0.5689***  0.6804*** 
  (0.080) (0.09)  (0.09) 
PRODm_rel 0.0005***   
  (0.04)   
PROD_RATIO 0.0339***   
  (0.04)   
  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(current USD), TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD, PRODm_relProductivity in 
industry as a proxy for productivity in manufacturing (Value added in constant 2005 USD over number of employees) relative to weighted average of 
partners, PROD_RATIO is the productivity in services over productivity in industry relative to weighted average of partners. GM-FMOLS 
estimations are taken with 1 lag for the variables and are calculated by the command @panelfm in RATS (Doan, 2012). In this Table are reported the 
results had without adding imfreg (the variable for the exchange rate regime), which is not one the fundamentals used to calculate the BEER. 
Incolumn (1) is reported again the baseline setup as in Table 2 to help in the comparison.Column (4) reports the results with a time trend 
included. All the specifications include a constant term. 
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Table 5: GM-FMOLS for Fixed vs. floating regimes (robustness check) 
  EU   FIXED   FLOAT   EU FIXED   FLOAT 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
  CPI REER   CPI REER   CPI REER   CPI REER   CPI REER   CPI REER   
                          
TB/gdp -2.0723   -1.7713***   -2.9819***               
  (0.314)   (0.294)   (0.894)               
CUMCA/gdp              -0.2904***   -0.2763***   -0.3278**   
              (0.04)   (0.024)   (0.139)   
TOT 0.6505***   0.5615*** 
  
0.9056*** 
  -0.1782***   -0.0937***   -0.6879***   
  (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.22)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.13)   
YDUSD 0.6225***   0.6164***   0.6166***   0.1718***   0.2259***   -0.2613***   
  (0.08)   (0.09)   (0.19)   (0.14)   (0.10)   (0.44)   
          
  
      
  
      
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(current USD) ,CUMCA/gdp is the cumulative CA over gdp in current USD, TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative 
per capita GDP in constant USD. GM-FMOLS estimations are taken with 1 lag for the regressors and are calculated by the command @panelfm in 
RATS. In this Table are reported the results had without adding imfreg (the variable for the exchange rate regime), which is not one the fundamentals 
used to calculate the BEER. In this case fixed regimes means imfreg =1 or 2, i.e. 1 = No separate legal tender, Pre announced peg or currency board 
arrangement, Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De facto peg. 2= Pre announced crawling peg, Pre announced 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De factor crawling peg, De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%. The 
other regimes are classified as “floating” towards the euro/ECU. For some countries (Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Cyprus) the regimes were floating in the first years of 90s, we used for these individuals fixed regimes for the calculations for the whole period. All 
the specifications include a constant term. 
 
Table 6: GM-FMOLS for an alternative model with the government expenditure (extension) 
  EU   core   periphery   CEECs   
euro 
(no CEECs)   euro 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER 
TB/gdp -1.5568   -4.1207***   -1.9463   1.0218***   -2.6547   -2.4680 
  (0.276)   (0.440)   (0.672)   (0.387)   (0.417)   (0.370) 
TOT 0.3256***   0.8538***   0.6409   -0.3552***   0.6431***   0.6685*** 
  (0.08)   (0.14)   (0.17)   (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.11) 
YDUSD 0.673***   0.6204***   0.2991***   0.9586***   0.5407***   0.5483*** 
  (0.07)   (0.16)   (0.11)   (0.08)   (0.11)   (0.10) 
    
      
  
GOV_EXP -0.1484*** -0.5474*** 0.2999 -0.0711*** -0.1452 -0.1747** 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(current USD) , TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD, GOV_EXP is Total 
Government expenditure (current USD) over GDP relative to weighted average of partners. GM-FMOLS estimations are taken with 1 lag for the 
variables and are calculated by the command @panelfm in RATS (Doan, 2012). In this Table are reported the results had without adding imfreg (the 
variable for the exchange rate regime), which is not one the fundamentals used to calculate the BEER. All the specifications include a constant term. 
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Figure 1a: REER misalignments for core countries (TB/GDP) 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
 
Figure 1b: REER misalignments for core countries (CUMCA/GDP) 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
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Figure 2a: REER misalignments for periphery countries (TB/GDP) 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
 
Figure 2b: REER misalignments for periphery countries (CUMCA/GDP) 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive.  
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Figure 3a: REER misalignments for CEECs (TB/GDP) 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
 
Figure 3b: REER misalignments for CEECs (CUMCA/GDP) 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
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Figure 4: REER misalignments: Germany vs. Italy 
TB/GDP                                                                 CUMCA/GDP 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
 
Figure 5: REER misalignments: Ireland vs. UK 
TB/GDP                                                               CUMCA/GDP 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive.  
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Figure 6: REER misalignments: Finland vs. Sweden 
TB/GDP                                                               CUMCA/GDP 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
 
Figure 7: REER misalignments: Croatia vs. Slovenia 
TB/GDP                                                               CUMCA/GDP 
 
Note: positive (negative) values mean that the actual REER is higher (lower) than the “equilibrium” value and the 
country is less (more) competitive. 
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Figure 8: BEER (with TB/GDP as regressor) vs. REER in 2002 and 2010 
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Figure 9: BEER (with CUMCA/GDP as regressor) vs. REER in 2002 and 2010 
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Annex 1: SOURCE AND DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Variable Sources Description 
REER_37_CPI Eurostat REER 2005=100. Deflator: CPI ; vis-à-vis37 
partner countries 
TB_GDPgs World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Trade balance as a share of GDP (current USD)  - 
goods and services 
CUMCA IMF WEO (October 2013) Cumulative Current Account in Billions current US 
dollars 
CUMCA/trade IMF WEO (October 2013) ; 
IMF IFS 
Cumulative Current Account balance in million 
USD over trade in goods and services (exports + 
imports). Current USD. 
CUMCA/gdp IMF WEO (October 2013) ; 
IMF IFS 
Cumulative Current Account balance in million 
USD over GDP. Current USD. 
NFA Lane & MF (2007) EWN 
database 
Net foreignAsset position 
NFA/gdp Lane & MF (2007) EWN 
database; IMF WEO April 2013 
Net foreign Asset position over GDP (current 
million USD) 
NFA_trade Lane & MF (2007) EWN 
database; IMF IFS  
NFA over trade in goods and services: exports + 
imports (current million USD) 
Yd* Eurostat, DG Ecfin (for the 
weights) 
GDP per capita in constant Euro relative to 
weighted average of partners* 
Ydppp* World Bank World 
Development Indicators,  DG 
Ecfin (for the weights) 
GDP per capita in constant PPP to weighted 
average of partners* 
Ydusd* World Bank World 
Development Indicators,  DG 
Ecfin (for the weights) 
GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD relative to 
weighted average of partners* 
TOT World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Terms of trade = export unit value/import unit 
value. 2000=100 
PRODm_rel* WB WDI (value added and % of 
employment in services and 
industry); Eurostat (total 
employment head count); DG 
Ecfin (weights); OECD (Greece 
GDP per sector in constant 2005 
USD - B1GVB_E: industry, 
energy included). 
Productivity in industry as a proxy for productivity 
in manufacturing (Value added in constant 2005 
USD over number of employees) relative to 
weighted average of partners* - Data for France 
and Ireland are the same for 2009,2010 and 2011. 
Data for Japan are the same from 2005 onwards 
and for US from 2008 onwards (lack of 
availability). For Greece I used GDP per sector in 
constant 2005 USD instead of the value added per 
sector (OECD B1GVB_E: industry, energy 
included). 
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PRODs_rel* WB WDI (value added and % of 
employment in services and 
industry); Eurostat (total 
employment head count, 
bilateral exchange rate and GDP 
deflator); DG Ecfin (weights) 
Productivity in services (Value added in constant 
2005 USD over number of employees) relative to 
weighted average of partners*. Services correspond 
to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value 
added in wholesale and retail trade (including 
hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, 
financial, professional, and personal services such 
as education, health care, and real estate services. 
Also included are imputed bank service charges, 
import duties, and any statistical discrepancies 
noted by national compilers as well as 
discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added 
is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is 
calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. The industrial 
origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), revision 3. Constructions not included in 
services. Data for France and Japan are the same 
for 2009 and 2010. Ireland data are built from the 
value added in current national currency, deflated 
by GDP deflator and by using the exchange rate 
vis-a-vis the US dollar. 
PROD_ratio* WB WDI (value added and % of 
employment in services and 
manufacturing); Eurostat (total 
employment head count); DG 
Ecfin (weights) 
Productivity in services over productivity in 
industry relative to weighted average of partners* 
Imfreg 1994-2007: Reinhart and Rogoff 
website 
http://www.reinhartandrogoff.co
m/data/browse-by-
topic/topics/12/ Data are based 
on IMF De Facto Exchange Rate 
Regimes (Coarse classification 
codes). Dataset for Ilzetzki, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
2008-2012: Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (various 
reports year until 2012) 
The classification codes are: 1 = No separate legal 
tender, Pre announced peg or currency board 
arrangement, Pre announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De facto peg. 2= 
Pre announced crawling peg, Pre announced 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2%, De factor crawling peg, De facto crawling 
band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%. 3= 
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or 
equal to +/-2%, De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-5%, Moving band that 
is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for 
both appreciation and depreciation over time), 
Managed floating. 4= Freely floating, 5=Freely 
falling. 
GOV_exp* WB WDI Total Government expenditure (current USD) over 
GDP relative to weighted average of partners*. 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(formerly general government consumption) 
includes all government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most 
expenditure on national defense and security, but 
excludes government military expenditures that are 
part of government capital formation. 
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DUMMY VARIABLES 
CORE Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK. 
PERIPHERY Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain 
CEEC Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
EURO_NOCEEC Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
EURO The euro zone as in 2012. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. 
 
Otherusefulvariables 
defl_GDP_eu EU Commission, AMECO 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/db_indicators/ameco/
index_en.htm 
Annual macro-economic database (Last update : 3 
May 2013 ) -  Price deflator gross domestic product at 
market prices (PVGD). In National currencies or euro 
2005 = 100. 
nom_GDP Eurostat Nominal GDP in euro 2005 
GDP_eu IMF IFS GDP in current euro 
EURUSD Eurostat 16/09/2013 updated version of Euro/ECU exchange 
rates - annual data (average) [ert_bil_eur_a] 
GDP_pc_eu Eurostat Real GDP per capita - annual Data [nama_aux_gph]. 
Euro per inhabitant. 
w* DG Ecfin, Price and cost 
competitiveness 
Weights as for REER vis-à-vis 37 partners. The 
weights change over time. 
 
Notes:* 37 partner countries except: Australia, Canada, Mexico and New Zealand (-0.01/0.04 of the total). 
IMF WEO is relative to April 2013 if not otherwise specified.
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Annex 2: The dynamic setup 
Following the approach by Chudik and Mongardini (2007) and Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004), we did the 
same estimation by using dynamic heterogeneous panel methods from an Error Correction Model setup. 
These estimators as in Pesaran and Smith (1995) are developed starting from an ARDL approach 
reparametrized into an Errror Correction Model.  
The generalized case of ARDL (p,q1…qk) as in Blackburne and Frank (2007)28, is as follow: 
W, =	∑ 0tW,`tutV + ∑ vtBwtV A,`t + ' + #,																																																																																																				(14)	
where the number of periods t=1,2…T ; the units i =1,2…N; A, is a vector of regressors k x 1; vt′ is a vector 
k x j of coefficients; 0t are scalars and ' are individual fixed effects; p is the total number of lags for y and 
q are the lags concerning the regressors.  
Therefore, we proceed to reparametrize our ARDL into an ECM framework. The generalized form of ECM 
is taken from Blackburne and Frank (2007) and reported below: 
xW, =	yzW,` − {BA,| +	∑ 0t∗u`tV xW,`t +	∑ vtB∗w`tV xA,`t + ' + #,                                          (15) 
where 
y = −1 − ∑ 0tu`tV , { = vt/1 − ∑ 033 , 0t∗ = −∑ 0FuFVt2 and vt∗ = −∑ vFwFVt2 . 
In order to estimate this non-stationary panel in which the number of groups is less than the number of time-
series observations, we follow the recent advances in the non-stationary panel literature apply the mean-
group estimator (MG) of Pesaran and Smith (1995) which allow our model to have the requested 
heterogeneity. 
In Figure I, we reported the results for the equation with the Trade Balance and in Figure II the results 
concern the cumulative CA over GDP. 
The coefficients for the transfer effect are still negative, except for the CEECs. The sign of all the other 
determinants vary much among the groups. The Balassa-Samuelson variable is only significant in some 
cases, namely in Table I for CEECs and whole EU and in Table II in periphery and euro zone.  The 
magnitudes are almost everywhere smaller, except in the case of core countries TB/gdp and Terms of trade. 
 
                                                          
28This is based on Pesaran and Shin (1997). 
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Table I: MG estimates for the convergence in the long-run 
  EU   core   periphery   CEECs   
euro 
(no CEECs)   euro 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER 
TB/gdp -0.631 
  -4.943*   -0.552   3.240   -2.637   -1.973 
  (2.256)   (2.624)   (3.884)   (4.516)   (2.439)   (2.177) 
TOT 0.595 
  2.276**   -0.0528   -0.520   1.278   1.089 
  (0.614)   (0.893)   (1.094)   (1.038)   (0.867)   (0.766) 
YDUSD 0.105 
  
-1.277 
  
1.184 
  0.675***   -0.397   -0.262 
  (0.640)   (1.661)   (0.777)   (0.211)   (1.244)   (1.088) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(current USD) , TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD. MG estimations are taken 
with 1 lag for the variables and are calculated by the command xtpmg in Stata (Blackburne III and Frank, 2007). Dependent variable is in first 
differences and in each regression we include the contemporaneous first difference of the regressors too. We reported here only the long-run 
coefficients. 
 
 
Table II: MG estimates for convergence in the long-run 
  EU   core   periphery   CEECs   
euro 
(no CEECs)   euro 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER CPI REER 
CUMCA/gdp 0.167 -0.354 -0.170 0.856 -0.406** -0.386*** 
  (0.525) (0.306) (0.221) (1.312) (0.169) (0.148) 
TOT 0.740 0.0923 -0.359 2.028 0.173 0.224 
  (0.922) (0.473) (0.276) (2.314) (0.312) (0.281) 
YDUSD 0.644 0.0530 1.583** 0.584 1.269** 1.180*** 
  (0.595) (0.847) (0.662) (1.262) (0.493) (0.434) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TB/GDP is the Trade balance of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(current USD) , TOT is the log of the Terms of Trade, YDUSD is the log of the relative per capita GDP in constant USD. MG estimations are taken 
with 1 lag for the variables and are calculated by the command xtpmg in Stata (Blackburne III and Frank, 2007). Dependent variable is in first 
differences and in each regression we include the contemporaneous first difference of the regressors too. We reported here only the long-run 
coefficients. 
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